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1. Introduction 
 
It is not easy to add something new to numerous articles that have 
appeared recently in most European countries in relation to the EC Green and 
White papers on private actions for damages as a consequence of 
anticompetitive conducts.  
 
The aim of the present article is to outline from a European perspective 
the differences in implementation of collective private enforcement in two 
member States, namely in the United Kingdom and in Italy.3 
 
As correctly argued, the legal ground for private enforcement for 
infringement of antitrust provisions of the EC Treaty (namely Articles 81 and 82 
EC) is based on the general doctrine of the direct effect of some provisions of 
the Treaty, as well as of the principle of ‘full effectiveness’ of Community Law. 
 
                                                 
1
 LL.M., European Law Institute, Brussels; M.Phil., and Ph.D. candidate, King’s College London;  
visiting lecturer of EC and Italian competition law at Università di Roma 3 School of Law;  
Law Society’s REL and Rome Bar.  
 
2
 LL.M., University of Manchester; Ph.D. in European Law at the faculty of Political Sciences,  
Università di Roma La Sapienza and Università di Messina. Author of Sections 5 to 7 of the present 
paper. For both the authors the usual disclaimer applies; they also wish to make a special 
acknowledgment to Renato Nazzini, University of Southampton’s lecturer and legal adviser of the 
Office of Fair Trading, for his precise and useful comments. 
 
3
 Collective action is the neutral wording to describe any form of collective legal action by (‘class  
action’) or on behalf of (‘representative action’) a group of claimants. As we will specify further, ‘class  
action’ is the term often improperly used in Europe to describe any form of legal action carried out by 
groups of claimants. In fact only the US-style collective actions can be called ‘class actions’ (in which 
a group of individuals and entities, lead by a lawyer, personally and jointly seek compensation or 
relief for the damages suffered. On the other hand, the representative action (the European ‘class 
action’) is the action where a representative body (i.e. a consumer association) brings an action on 
behalf of a group of claimants. 
 
 
 22 
The position taken by the European Court of Justice in key judgments 
such as Van Gend en Loos4 and Defrenne v Sabena5 might be recalled as 
seminal points for the ‘direct effect’ doctrine, that twenty years later provided the 
legal basis for the Crehan v Courage6 judgment, and subsequently the 
Manfredi7 judgment, both cases dealing with the acknowledgment of the right to 
damages for individuals (and businesses) having sued the responsible party of 
infringement according to Art. 81 (and/or Art. 82) EC. 
 
Leaving aside the general provisions of the EC Treaty on economic 
integration and growth of the European market, another legal basis for private 
enforcement, in general, and for individual or collective actions in particular, can 
be found in the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in 
Section 38 that expressly recognises that ‘Union policies shall ensure a high 
level of consumer protection’.8  
More specifically, the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003/EC, that entered 
into force in May 2004, clearly stressed the need for cooperation between the 
enforcers (the European Commission and the National Competition Authorities), 
on the one hand, and the national Courts, on the other, reaffirming the principle 
of ‘dual forms’ of enforcement: public and private9. 
 
The collective action in the EU legal system represents a step forward. 
On the one hand, individual private enforcement, through the acknowledgement 
of the right to damages for individuals harmed by anticompetitive behaviours, is 
the adequate counter-part to public enforcement in order to enhance the 
                                                 
 
4
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deterrence effect of the prohibitions contained in Article 81 and 82 EC (i.e. the 
nullity of the anticompetitive agreement provided by Art. 81.2) and of the 
antitrust remedies contained in Regulation 1/2003 (i.e. fines, interim measures, 
structural and functional measures). On the other, collective action, with a 
theoretically very high number of potential claimants, further strengthens the 
deterrence effect of individual private action.10 
 
From a legal point of view, the choice of individual action or collective 
action may be strategically decisive, for a variety of reasons.  
 
In terms of legal strategy, the lawyer first of all will advise the client taking 
into consideration the applicable substantial or procedural laws. At the same 
time, he will take into account the efficiency of the local legal system(s) where 
the lawsuit might be filed (with the related risk of ‘forum shopping’: the 
defendant will aim at ensuring that the trial takes place in a country where the 
proceedings will last longer11, or where the rules on evidence are particularly 
burdensome; the plaintiff will seek to file the action in a country where it is 
more likely that the trial will be ‘quickly’ brought to an end). The plaintiff will 
also be informed that in some jurisdictions a quantity of appeals and reviews, 
sometimes for each phase of the legal proceedings, are likely to occur. 
 
The present article tackles the collective action keeping in mind twin 
areas of analysis: class action as it originated and developed in the US legal 
system, and is currently proposed, with modifications, by the European 
Commission as a further tool of enforcement at national level, is one12 ; the 
other is an analysis of two national examples of collective action legislation, one 
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court. As mentioned above, in Europe it should instead be called ‘representative action’, since the 
law-suit is normally carried out by a ‘representative body’, such as a consumer association or 
organisation which triggers the action on behalf of a large group of consumers.  
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already into force (United Kingdom) and one recently adopted but currently 
suspended (Italy). In both cases probably criticism outweighs positive 
assessments. In the perspective of different forms of collective actions soon 
available in Europe, it must be taken into consideration the existence in UK of a 
recently reformed Civil Procedure Code that makes this system particularly 
appealing for those claimants (undertakings and consumers) seeking expedite 
legal proceedings. 
  
Before examining in more detail the mechanisms of the European ‘class 
action’, a few words explain how this legal category entered into the European 
legal system. 
 
It is worth recalling the ‘state of play’ of institutions in Europe vis à vis the 
introduction of a European ‘class action’ (Section 2). This was an American 
legal instrument introduced into a European system based more on the concept 
of loss-based compensation and gain-based restitution, therefore making it 
highly debatable. We will examine how the enterprises part of anticompetitive 
conducts and the consumers (and other businesses in relation with the 
mentioned enterprises) will be affected by the legislative changes that have 
been introduced (or will be introduced soon) for collective actions in some 
European member States. 
 
Sections 3-4 will deal with the collective action (officially ‘representative 
action’) introduced in the United Kingdom by the Enterprise Act 2002; while the 
final sections (Sections 5-6-7) will deal with the Italian ‘class action’. 
 
Through this dual perspective, it should be possible to sketch what might 
be the legal strategies which will be undertaken by those European (and third 
country) enterprises or individuals that at some point are called to face (or 
decide to trigger) competition law  private enforcement legal proceedings. 
 
2.  The European idea of a ‘class action’: a private enforcement 
remedy to re-address anticompetitive behaviours and protect consumers 
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Is the collective action in Europe a new ‘European madness’, as some 
scholars have called it?13 
 
Certainly one could agree with those who have described the US class 
action as one of the tools that antitrust lawyers use to protect individual rights. 
In the US, antitrust law is a tool as important to enforce individual rights, as the 
Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights actually are.14 
 
Antitrust infringements impact not only the few targeted enterprises but 
on consumer welfare, and society as a whole.15  
 
In the US, antitrust laws are seen as a tool to realise constitutional 
principles, such as the famous ‘pursuit of happiness’ encapsulated at the very 
heart of the entire US legal system.  
 
In the US, public enforcement as a consequence of an antitrust 
infringement plays a key role. Antitrust infringements are acted upon with 
particular determination by the State and Federal Courts, the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.  
 
However, antitrust lawyers, acting privately for clients (enterprises, 
consumers) damaged by anti-competitive behaviours, are considered ‘private 
attorneys general’, whose activities are complementary to public enforcement.  
 
The risks of deviation from the ‘private attorney general’ model are seen 
in the US as particularly serious. The fact that antitrust cases are often 
combined with other, parallel, non-competition-law-related infringements, may 
create the impression that a large number of greedy lawyers are in search of 
the ‘case of the year’ to generate enormous profits. In fact, the highly 
                                                 
13
 Gordon Schnell, Class Action Madness in Europe - Call for a More Balanced Debate, European  
Competition Law Review, Issue 11, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, pp. 617 et seq. 
 
14
 Gordon Schnell, Class Action Madness in Europe, p. 617. Concept stated in US v Topco Assoc., 405  
U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 
15
 This is particularly evident when dealing with fundamental goods of daily life. Not everybody is called  
to deal with ethanbutol, but more likely with his moped insurance, or with the price of bread, milk and 
phone calls. 
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specialised sector in which antitrust lawyers operate makes it particularly risky, 
and often not economically interesting, given they have to demonstrate the 
(difficult to prove) combined presence of higher prices, reduced output, 
restriction of consumers’ choice.16 However, the occurrence in the US of a few 
distorted uses of the class-action mechanism has thrown a negative light on this 
otherwise successful remedy against the most serious anticompetitive 
behaviours.  
 
From a strategic point of view (given the agreements signed between the 
legal counsel and their clients) lawyers do not always chose univocal conduct.  
 
In some cases they might encourage ‘offensive litigation’ (‘fishing 
expedition’) trying to get the highest amount of liquidated damages, in particular 
when they are directly calculated as a fraction of the final monetary outcome, 
established by the Court (‘contingency fees’). However it is evident that in such 
a case the longer the proceedings last, the lower the profit is for the lawyer. 
More often, lawyers prefer to separately negotiate their fees as part of the 
settlement agreement. To ‘encourage’ the settlement, they might also negotiate 
‘escalating fees’ with their clients with respect to the time spent on the case.  
 
An interesting example of settlement in recent times is the case Carole 
Eustice v. Network Associates, Inc.17, with respect to a class action against 
McAfee filed with the Supreme Court of California in 2004. The plaintiff alleged 
that Network Associates had violated California State Law and breached their 
licence agreements by failing to provide free lifetime updates to purchasers of 
versions 3 and/or 4 of McAfee Virus Scan software.  
 
McAfee (Network Associates) denied any liability, but preferred to settle, 
and agreed to give each class action member a free download of the perpetual 
version of McAfee Virus Scan, Anti-spyware and Quick Clean software, to be 
                                                 
16
 The US government was therefore called to adopt a ‘Class Action Fairness Act’ in 2005 (Pub. L. No.  
109-2 (2005) to make further difficult the class action in State courts, where more often lawyers used  
to get huge profits from illegal attorney recoveries. 
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 The settlement proposal can be found at http://software.mcafee.com/lcas/pdf/class_notice.pdf 
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downloaded by the members of the class action within a certain time-limit. 
Interestingly, the ‘class counsel’ under the settlement agreement was to be paid 
$ 227,000 in attorneys’ fees. In this case the difference between the final 
‘compensation’ received by the plaintiffs and the huge attorneys’ fee may 
perhaps explain some of the doubts that emerged in Europe with respect to the 
effectiveness in terms of ‘moral suasion’ of a European ‘class action’. 
 
However there are examples of class actions in which the final outcome 
can be considered as fully satisfactory in terms of ‘consumer interest’ (as 
correctly recorded by Schnell in his recent article). In the Visa-Master Card 
class action, carried out on behalf of five million merchants against the 
exclusionary conducts in the debit card market, the costs carried by the plaintiffs 
(around $18 million and 250,000 hours of attorney time), were mostly 
compensated by the resultant $ 3.4 billion in monetary damages and tens of 
billions of dollars in reduced pricing (to restore effective competition).18 
 
At EU level, the contours of a new, European, form of ‘class action’ have 
been recently outlined in the White Paper ‘Damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules’19, published in April 2008. It was anticipated by the Green 
Paper, dating to December 200520, and is published in conjunction with a Staff 
Working Paper and other documents, which should help the Commission staff 
create further European legislation on this topic.  
 
Taking into consideration what has been produced in recent times, it is 
difficult to clearly define the boundaries of ‘damages actions’. These are not 
limited to private single individual actions, but also encompass ‘class actions’. 
                                                 
18
 Re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp.2d 503, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). See the  
conclusions of Schnell’s ‘Class Action Madness in Europe’, on the arguable importance of the first 
‘class action’ case in the overpriced football shirts in UK (Case no. 1078/7/9/07, Consumers 
Association v JJB Sports Plc, registered 5 March 2007, CAT).  
 
19
 Hereinafter, the ‘White Paper’, published in Brussels the 2 April 2008, COM (2008) 16 final. It can be  
downloaded 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/whitepaper_en.pd
f  
 
20
 Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005)  
672 final. The Green Paper must be read in conjunction with the Commission Staff Working Paper 
(Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules, SEC(2005) 1732. 
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Under this model, damages might be awarded to any person injured by 
anticompetitive behaviours, i.e. not only direct competitors, but also direct (and 
indirect, under specific circumstances) purchasers and final consumers. 
 
From a strategic point of view, the reaction of the plaintiffs and 
defendants will vary. The direct purchasers will try to carry on a form of 
‘offensive passing-on’ attack. On the other hand, the defendants will try to 
defend themselves by demonstrating that the plaintiffs had actually passed-on 
their extra-costs (‘passing on defence’). 
 
If individual, private, actions follow the normal rules of civil proceedings 
then two forms of collective action should be possible: 
 
(i) representative actions by consumers groups, public entities, trade 
associations, expressly ‘certified’ for this scope21 
 
(ii) opt-in collective claims for consumers and businesses (as distinguished  
from the opt-out collective claims). 
The first mentioned (representative actions) is the form of collective 
private enforcement introduced in United Kingdom and, more recently, in Italy; 
the second is probably the closest to the ‘class action’ in the broader US 
sense. 
 
On the evidence and burden of proof side, the White Paper stresses the 
necessity of reducing the obstacles to gathering proof for the plaintiff, in general 
the weakest part.  
 
The follow-on civil claims (as distinguished from the ‘stand-alone’ claims) 
are based on the binding force of the decisions adopted by the Commission and 
by national competition authorities, as well as final judgement (or judicial 
review) made by EC or national courts. 
                                                 
 
21
 These may be (i) officially designated in advance or (ii) certified on an ad hoc basis by a Member  
state for a particular antitrust infringement to bring an action on behalf of some or all of their 
members (White Paper, page 4). 
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Another target of the White Paper is to make the enterprise’s liability 
objective to enhance the capacity of plaintiff to trigger civil proceedings (‘fault 
must not be proved’). Similarly, the compensation shall be not limited to the 
actual losses, but also to the lost profits and interest (a combination of the 
compensation and restitution-based systems). 
 
The White Paper also focuses on the necessity of preserving the main 
aim of the leniency application, i.e. encouraging members of the cartel to 
provide the Commission (or the National Competition Authorities, where 
applicable) with any relevant information that may be considered sufficient to 
trigger an investigation without being unnecessarily exposed to the private 
enforcement actions on the basis of the documents provided by leniency 
applicants. Therefore, materials provided to underpin the claims contained in 
the leniency application cannot be disclosed for private actions purposes.22 
The White Paper23 recalls two recent ‘mile-stone’ judgments: Courage v. 
Crehan and Manfredi to underline that the Court of Justice has clearly affirmed 
that: 
 
‘any individual’ who has suffered harm caused by an antitrust 
infringement must be allowed to claim damages before national courts’.24 
 
Since it does not make any distinction between individual and collective 
actions, the White Paper clearly aims to encourage forms of ‘collective redress’. 
Collective, representative actions would represent a mechanism ‘allowing 
aggregation of the individual claims of victims of antitrust infringements’ since 
the individuals (consumer, but also small businesses) are often discouraged 
from embarking into burdensome civil proceedings, and even deterred by the 
high costs of justice.  
 
                                                 
22
 For a detailed analysis of the recent White Paper, see an excellent article by Assimakis P.  
Komninos, The EU White Paper for damages actions: A first appraisal’, in Concurrences – Revue  
des droits de la concurrence, n. 2 – 2008, pp. 84-92. 
 
23
 White Paper, p. 4. 
24
  Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297, and joined Cases C-295-298/04,  
Manfredi, [2006] ECR I-6619.  
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The White Paper also acknowledges that, in the absence of clear 
legislation on the point, the present legal proceedings carried out to redress the 
harm suffered by group of individuals have serious procedural inefficiencies. 
The White Paper advocates further refinement of the legislation also at national 
level, to encourage and facilitate the introduction of collective civil proceedings, 
alongside the traditional individual actions. 
 
3. The British Approach: Follow-on and stand-alone ‘representative’ 
actions 
 
As a general rule, in the United Kingdom some bodies have the right to 
carry out ‘representative’ actions on behalf of consumers, when the Office of 
Fair Trading (‘OFT’) or the Commission already has made a decision regarding 
an anti-competitive behaviour. The principle, therefore, in the UK is to admit 
only ‘follow-on’ representative actions. 25 
This represents an enhanced form of private action, because it also 
allows groups of damaged consumers to get adequate protection in terms of the 
recovery of damages as a consequence of anti-competitive conducts, in line 
with the Modernisation Regulation principles. However, the idea is now to 
further enlarge the possibility of action, authorising ‘stand-alone’ actions, i.e. 
those actions which do not need to be preceded by a OFT / Commission 
decision. 26 
 
                                                 
 
25
 In 1999 under the UK Civil Procedural Rules (‘CPR’) Group Litigation Orders were introduced to  
extend the access to justice. A Group Litigation Order is issued for claims which ‘give rise to 
common or related issues of fact or law’. These claims are carried out by a group, usually of at 
least ten claimants normally lead by the same lawyer. Any claimant must expressly ‘opt in’ to 
participate to this form of collective action. This kind of actions has been issued in a panoply of 
areas, ranging from product liability to compatibility with UK tax provisions. If the parties have the 
‘same interest’ (under Section 19 of the CPR) will rather file a representative action. As an example 
of representative action, see further in the same section the description of the representative action 
under Section 47A and 47B of the Competition Act 98, brought by a ‘specialised body’ on behalf of 
consumers in claims for damages for breach of UK or EC competition law. 
 
26
 On this point see Stephen Kon and Amy Barcroft, Aspects of the Complementary Roles of Public  
and Private Enforcement of UK and EU Antitrust Law: An Enforcement Deficit?, E.C.L.R. [2008], 
Issue 1, page 11 et seq. 
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A further step will be the extension of follow-on and stand-alone actions 
to business, not just to consumers.27  
 
England will probably become the ‘forum’ where many antitrust 
(individual and collective) actions will be triggered in the future for a number of 
reasons: the faster speed of a normal trial; the rules on disclosure; the 
enshrined capacity to assess complex business litigation. The question is 
whether collective actions (stand-alone or follow-on) from other parts of Europe 
will be filed alongside individual actions.  
 
From a legislative point of view the basic principles on which private 
actions are based are the Competition ACT 1998 (‘CA98’) and the Enterprise 
Act 2002 (‘EA02’). The CA98 introduced the main provisions (Chapter I and II 
Prohibitions) prohibiting the same anticompetitive conducts foreseen by Article 
81 and 82 EC (anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominant position). 
The EA02, on the other hand, modified the CA98 introducing substantial 
changes making possible the present private enforcement policy strongly 
encouraged by both the Commission and the UK Competition Authority 
(including the Competition Commission). In particular, the EA02 created the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) that, among other competences, is also 
empowered to award damages (and to deal with other monetary claims) for 
violation of CA98 provisions.28  
 
It was the EA02 that established the right of third parties (private, and in 
principle, groups of consumers) to carry out private litigation for the recovery of 
                                                 
 
27
 On the different impact of ‘follow-on’ actions and ‘stand-alone’ actions, see the OFT’s  
Recommendations Paper (‘Private Actions in Competition Law: effective redress for consumers and 
business’, OFT 916Resp, available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916resp.pdf) where states ‘[a]s competition 
authorities have finite resources, this limits the number of cases in which consumers can seek 
redress: it is not realistic to expect that a competition authority could investigate all cases where 
consumers have been harmed and then take on the role of securing redress for them. If competition 
authorities were to pursue every single alleged infringement, this would weaken rather than 
strengthen the competition regime’.   
28
 The CAT is formed by a three ‘judge’ panel: the president (or a member of the panel of chairmen,  
i.e. judges of the Chancery Division of the High Court and other senior lawyers) and two other 
members which are chosen from a panel made by economists, accountants and competition law 
experts. Of course, preceding the provisions introduced by the EA02, private individual actions could 
be in any case filed with the High Court. 
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damages and other monetary claims as a consequence of infringements of 
Article I and II Prohibitions and Articles 81 and 82 EC.  
 
However, CAT actions are possible only as ‘follow-on’ claims, based on 
previous decisions made by the OFT or the Commission. When no previous 
decisions exist, private actions for damages are filed before the civil courts. 
Technically, follow-on law suits before the CAT can be filed within two years of 
the ‘relevant’ date. The ‘relevant’ date is the date in which the period of time 
after which it is permitted to carry out an appeal before the European Court 
against any decision has expired; or, if the appeal has been regularly filed, the 
date in which it has been decided. However the CAT may authorise an action 
filed before the relevant date, after a hearing with the defendant.  
 
Actions may be brought either before the CAT or the High Court. 
 
The EA02 also introduced the entity of a specialised body that is entitled 
to carry on ‘representative actions’ on behalf of group of consumers. 
 
In fact the first entity which triggered an action against JJB Sports for 
price fixing of ‘replica’ England and Manchester United football kits is the 
Consumers’ Association. The case was finally settled.29  
On the model of the European Commission, last year the OFT also 
launched a consultation process30, suggesting that in due course the UK 
government adopt new pieces of legislation to enhance the present system, 
mainly ‘public enforcement-centred’. 
 
The UK legal system, among European legal systems, being the closest 
to the US legal system, will take on a pioneer role in the enlarged EU of the 
                                                 
29
 Case no. 1078/7/9/07, Consumers Association v JJB Sports Plc, registered 5 March 2007, CAT. See  
above, n. 7. 
   
30
 Office of Fair Trading, Private Actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers  
and business-Recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading. OFT 916 resp., November 2007. 
See also the Business Plan of the OFT for the coming years (2008-2010) available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/about_oft/ap09/ap09.pdf. To develop the private enforcement policy 
is set as one of OFT’s main targets. 
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future for launching a new private enforcement front, not only in terms of 
substantial antitrust law, but also in terms of procedural techniques.31  
However, since the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003, which has clearly 
stated the need for decentralisation, and given the enhanced role of the national 
courts to enforce Art. 81 and 82 EC, in the United Kingdom there are still very 
few cases of private enforcement (though more cases have been settled before 
going to court).32  
 
 The leading case in the UK at present is Healthcare at Home Ltd v. 
Genzyme Ltd in which interim damages were awarded. 
 
The United Kingdom is now looking to enhance stand-alone actions. It is 
still concerned by the plethora of reasons that might discourage class actions, 
ranging from the difficulty of convincing groups of plaintiffs to undertake what 
may appear costly (or indeed very costly) proceedings for what is still a ‘pioneer’ 
approach in this field.33 
One of the main concerns is represented by those collective actions that 
may have, either on the plaintiff’s or defendant’s side, elements of connection 
with other jurisdictions.  
 
EC Regulation 44/2001 governs the choice of the jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters (‘Brussels Regulation’), providing the defendants with a 
wide range of possibilities when facing the choice of the most suitable 
jurisdiction. However it must be noted that just recently the UK courts have 
shown their willingness to de-localise the trials towards those courts in other EU 
member states, where the case seems that can be best decided.34 
                                                 
31
 It must be remembered that in April 1999 new civil procedure rules were introduced in  
 England by Lord Wolfe. The aims of the reform set out by Lord Wolfe were to modernise court 
procedures to create a fairer, cheaper and more efficient dispute resolution process.  
 
32
 See Barry J. Rodger, Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition  
Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005, [2008] E.C.L.R., p. 96-116. 
 
33
 See Kon and Barcroft: Enforcement deficit in antitrust law, [2008] G.C.L.R., page 12. The UK Civil  
Justice Council report recently pointed out that ‘[a]ccess to justice is still disproportionately weighted 
against claimants whether they are groups of consumers, small businesses, employees, or victims of 
mass torts [Q] ‘This has resulted in few claims being brought and, significantly, demonstrates that a 
number of meritorious claims simply have not seen the light of day’. 
 
34
 See SamDisk Corp v Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV [2007] EWHC 332 (Ch). 
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In the UK at the beginning of the current year (2008) only five damages 
actions had been lodged under s.47A of the CA98 (individual damages 
actions).35 Of the representative actions  filed under s.47B of CA98, we must 
recall an action launched in 2007, and then settled36. Another (stand-alone) 
‘class action’ has been recently triggered, in relation to the ‘sub-prime’ crisis.37 
 
The first UK follow-on action was filed by the British Consumers’ 
Association ‘Which’? against JJB Sports, and reached a settlement (announced 
on 8 January 2008) in which the 130 purchasers of replica football shirts 
received £ 20,00 each. Interestingly, the agreement is valid also to all those 
individuals who, even though they did not participate in the collective action, 
provide (within a certain time) a proof of purchase of a football replica shirt of 
JJB, or the shirt itself, being compensated with just £ 10,00. 
 
JJB, on the other hand, obtained in the settlement agreement a clause 
stating that individual who participated to the collective action ‘had suffered loss 
giving rise to an action for damages as a result of its words, actions or 
behaviours’.38 
 
Seeing the number of settlements already reached, it is possible to argue 
that in the next few years, before the rules for private individual or collective 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
35
 JJ Burgess & Sons v. W Austin & Sons (Stevenage) Ltd v Harwood Park Crematorium ltd  
(1044/2/1/04); Consumers’ Association v JJB Sports (1078/7/9/07); Emerson Electric Co v Morgan 
Crucible Co Plc (1077/5/7/07); Genzyme Ltd [2006] CAT 29 (settled after interim damages were 
awarded]; BCL Old Co Ltd v Aventis and Hoffman-La Roche (1028/5/5/7/04) [2005] CAT 2 (actions 
dismissed); Deans Foods Ltd v Aventis and Hoffman-La Roche (1029/5/7/04) (actions dismissed). 
See footnote 13, of Kon and Barcroft’s article ‘Enforcement deficit in Antitrust Law’, above.  
 
36
 Here the word ‘settlement’ must not be read in the ‘administrative’ meaning applicable to one of the  
ways of bringing to an early end the investigation (i.e. in cartel cases). It is rather an agreement 
between damaged parties and allegedly liable for the anticompetitive or anti-consumers behaviours, 
in order to bring a private litigation to an end before the natural end of the civil legal proceedings.  
 
37
 On the 12 August 2008 it was  announced that Lothian Pension Fund and the Northern Ireland  
Local Government Officer Superannuation Committee (NILGOSC) have been appointed as co-lead 
plaintiffs in a class action against Lehman Brothers for the subprime crises (source: 
http://www.ipe.com). Interestingly, one month later (September 2008) Lehman Brothers filed 
banckruptcy in the United States.  
 
38
 See footnote 14, Kon and Barcroft: Enforcement Deficit in Antitrust Law, 2008 G.C.L.R. 
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enforcement can be further developed, settlements will be the main way to 
satisfy both public and private enforcement imperative. 
 
Settlements procedures will reduce the ‘secrecy’ of normal antitrust 
proceedings. This is problematic, as a certain quantity of evidence useful for 
private enforcers will not be available anymore.39 A recent example of this 
outcome is the settlement reached in 2006 by a group of independent schools 
that had been exchanging information regarding tuition fees.40 The schools and 
admitted their liability and agreed to pay £ 3 million to a charitable trust in favour 
of affected students (and their parents); but only a symbolic fine of £ 10,000 for 
each school was imposed, as the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the 
effective economic loss for any student as a consequence of the anticompetitive 
conduct. In other words, this decision discouraged the possibility of multiple 
private enforcement actions against the schools. 
 
In other settlement cases the OFT, even though it obtained admissions of 
liability, in its final decision did not provide any further element to allow private 
persons to (individually or collectively) act against those responsible for the 
infringements. In particular, it was difficult for the damaged parties to infer from 
the settlement decision the amount of damage individually suffered, either 
because this was too difficult, or because the generic reconstruction of the 
illegal behaviour (without disclosing relevant details) was part of the ‘settlement 
package’.41 
 
                                                 
39
 Kon and Barcroft, Enforcement Deficit in Antitrust law, 2008 G.C.L.R., page 14. 
 
40
 OFT’s decision in case CA98/05/2006 ‘Exchange of information on future fees by certain  
independent fee-paying schools’, 26 November 2006. 
 
41
 See on the point, the case British Airways and Virgin Atlantic. OFT press release ORR/113/07 
issued on 1 August 2007 (http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/113-07). British Airways, 
prosecuted in a joint action carried out by the OFT and the US DoJ, was fined with £ 270 m (while 
Virgin Atlantic got immunity for having blown the whistle). The settlement signed in August 2008 to 
bring to an end the US class-action established that the companies will refund £ 10 for each 
passenger who travelled between 2004 and 2005 on long haul flights. The total amount to be paid 
has been set to $ 200 m as a compensation for 8m damaged customers. On 7 August 2008 the OFT 
also charged four former employees of British Airways with criminal offences for price-fixing, applying 
the recently introduced (2003) criminal provision aimed at eradicating cartels in United Kingdom. See 
also, in the supermarkets sector, the OFT press release 170/07 of 7 December 2007 and 22/08 of 15 
February 2008. Asda, Safeway and Sainsbury’s signed a settlement agreement with OFT (Morrison 
and Tesco did not settle). 
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From a ‘strategic’ point of view, a firm may therefore consider that 
settlement proceedings satisfy the urgency for the Competition Authority to 
bring to an end an alleged infringement; on the other hand, it might provide at 
least a certain number of victims with a certain amount of compensation, 
knowing that long and burdensome (both for the taxpayer and for the 
investigated enterprises) proceedings at the end would not reach the same level 
of overall ‘satisfaction’ that should be the target of any public body.  
 
Another interesting strategic perspective is that emerging from the 
leniency regime.  
 
Under UK law, the judges (the CAT, for instance) may take into 
consideration a ‘legitimate public interest objective’ in not disclosing information 
gathered by leniency applicants.  
 
Such ‘protective’ behaviours with respect to applicants is aimed at 
encouraging potential participants in an anti-competitive conduct to co-operate 
with the public enforcer. Therefore, an enterprise which decides to file a 
leniency application in UK, relying on the ‘legitimate public interest’ imperative, 
might find convenient to denounce its own behaviours (alongside those of the 
other parties of the illicit conduct) in order to prevent the disclosure of 
confidential information that otherwise, following to the disclosure in the 
Statement of Objections or in the final decision, might be used in a collective (or 
individual) private action for damages. 
 
On a similar note, the OFT Recommendations Paper actually suggest an 
express mitigation for the damages to be reimbursed by the leniency applicant, 
as well as the possibility of contribution to the payment of damages by the other 
participants to the anticompetitive conduct. Despite what the Discussion Paper 
suggested, the Recommendations Paper proposes a legislation which should 
encourage the leniency application excluding ‘joint and several’ liability. 
Therefore, the leniency applicants would be exclusively called to reimburse the 
exact damages they had caused with their behaviour.42 
                                                 
42
 Here a further difference with the US legal system can be found, since in the US each party of the  
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Finally a few notes on adding ‘stand-alone’ representative actions to 
existing ‘follow-on’ representative actions.  
 
The UK consultation process preceding the Recommendations Paper 
obtained a significant consensus about the possibility of introducing a ‘stand 
alone’ collective action for consumers, alongside a follow-on class action for 
businesses.43 They also emphasised that the ‘opt’-in’ model was preferable to 
any form of generalised participation in representative actions. 
 
The OFT recommendation tries to mitigate and balance the diverging 
interests of consumers and enterprises, also keeping in mind the highly 
sophisticated civil proceedings in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the OFT is 
certainly prone to admit ‘stand–alone’ proceedings for the consumers, and is 
planning to introduce representative actions on behalf of businesses for both 
‘follow-on’ and ‘stand alone’ actions. It also aims at promoting actions with 
respect to minor amounts of damages and is therefore planning to allow the 
judges to apply an ‘opt-out’ model of representative action for those cases that 
otherwise would see only a few, well informed, consumers  recover damages 
suffered. 
 
Another key point of OFT action will be allowing the distribution of 
damages on a ‘compensatory’ basis, but leaving open the possibility of 
awarding damages on a ‘restitutionary’ basis in specific cases (in particular, in 
presence of ‘opt-out’ representative actions with many participants). 
 
4. Defensive and offensive strategies at the European and UK level: 
the ‘passing-on defence’ and the ‘indirect purchasers’ standing’ 
 
The ‘passing-on defence’, in its cartel, price-fixing-related meaning, 
means that members of cartels will refuse to pay damages to those claimants 
                                                                                                                                                                  
anticompetitive conduct can be individually called to respond also for the damages inflicted by the 
other parties. 
 
43
 However, many participants to the consultation were against the option of stand alone actions.  
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who had ‘passed-on’ the overpricing to their customers, thereby completely or 
partially compensating their losses. 
 
Points 20 and 19 of the 2007 Parliament’s Resolution makes clear that:  
 
‘Member states that make provision for actions for indirect losses should 
grant the defendant the possibility of asserting a passing-on defence in 
order to avoid the possibility of unjust enrichment.’ 44 
 
However, it also underlines  
 
‘that [6] the possibility of defendants arguing that all or part of the gains 
they made as a result of the infringement have been transferred to third 
parties (the passing-on defence) would be detrimental to establishing the 
extent of the damage and the causal link’. 
 
In the United States the passing-on defence is not admitted. In Europe 
this is a much debated issue. Not admitting the passing-on defence may have a 
negative effect, since it would encourage and strengthen the relationship 
between members of the cartel and direct purchasers. The threat of being 
punished, even having passed on the over-charging, may strengthen the 
collusive relationship. 
 
This is a possible drawback, but ultimately it is not granted that the direct 
purchasers effectively will be able to pass on overcharged prices to their clients. 
In a perfectly competitive market, the final prices are generally established at 
the price of equilibrium. If someone purchases a good at a artificially higher 
price the further offer of a particular good will shrink, but the final purchasers will 
look elsewhere for the same good. The damage, in terms of reduction of the 
supply of a specific good, and in terms of quantity of money spent, is evident.  
 
                                                 
44
 European Parliament Resolution of 25 April 2007 on the Green Paper on Damages Actions for  
breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (2006/2207[INI]). 
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The damage caused to the direct purchaser is self-explanatory. The 
overcharged price will diminish the direct purchaser’s possibility to buy a certain 
product; and this will reduce the quantity of product sold, and, in the medium 
term, the market share.  
 
Point 2.6 of the White Paper makes some distinctions that may help the 
firm to consider its position vis-à-vis the passing on defence: 
 
 (i) The Commission reiterates that the Courts follow the 
‘compensatory principle’, and that damages shall be acknowledged 
to any injured party, even if that party may have passed–on the 
overcharge. What really matters is to show the ‘causal link’. 
 
 (ii) However, the Commission also acknowledges the risk of ‘unjust 
enrichment’ for those purchasers that effectively have passed on the 
overcharge to their customers; therefore the Commission suggests 
that ‘defendants should be entitled to invoke the passing-on defence 
against a claim for compensation of the overcharge. [However] the 
standard of proof for this defence should be not lower than the 
standard imposed on the claimant to prove the damage’.45 
 
In other words, the members of the cartel and the direct purchasers 
cannot automatically rely on the fact that the over-charge was passed on the 
final consumers.  
 
Another hypothesis is that the indirect purchaser may also claim to have 
been the ultimate victim of the anti-competitive behaviour, in order to claim for 
compensation (the so-called ‘indirect purchaser’s standing’). Unfortunately 
these individuals, often at the end of the distribution chain, may find it 
particularly difficult to demonstrate that they ultimately paid a price that was 
higher as an effect of an anticompetitive behaviour. If they are unable to show 
the causal link, those who have infringed competition law provisions would 
‘retain an unjust enrichment’. 
                                                 
45
 White Paper, point 2.6, page 8. 
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Therefore the Commission, to facilitate the compensation of damages 
suffered by indirect purchasers, suggests that: 
 
indirect purchasers should be able to rely on the rebuttable presumption 
that the illegal overcharge was passed on to them in its entirety.46 
 
This scenario shows how in Europe the Courts will be called to take a 
case-by-case approach, not excluding a priori the passing-on defence nor the 
indirect purchaser claims, but rather focusing the attention on the exercise of 
the burden of proof.  
 
At British level some differences might be underlined. If at a European 
level a general principle of ‘unjustified enrichment’ is admitted, as a basis for 
passing-on defence, this form of defence in the United Kingdom is admitted only 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 
In the Kleinwort Benson case, for instance, the Court of Appeal rejected 
the applicability of the passing-on defence.47 Here the issue at stake was the 
right to restitution of interest paid under a void interest-rate swap agreement. 
However the Court acknowledged the possibility, in principle, of apply the 
passing-on defence in case of the restitution of undue taxes where a public 
element is present.48 
 
With respect to indirect purchasers’ standing, in the UK legal system the 
principle of unjustified enrichment would not be applicable to justify per se the 
recovery of compensatory damages.  
 
                                                 
46
 On this point, see another difference with the US system, which does not acknowledge indirect  
purchasers damages. 
 
47
 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Birmingham City Council [1996] 3 W.L.R. 1139. See on the point C. 
Petrucci, The Issues of the Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchasers’ standing in European 
Competition Law, E.C.L.R., issue 1, 2008. 
 
48
 Petrucci, quoted, p. 40. 
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However, in the Courage case49 one of the key statements of the Court 
was that: 
 
The full effectiveness of Article 85 [now Article 81] of the Treaty 6 would 
be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for 
loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition, 
 
making clear that not only the direct victim of the illegal price-fixing but also any 
other individual could claim damages.50 
 
On this specific point Petrucci argues that the acknowledgment, in 
Courage, of the possibility that the overcharge was passed on to the indirect 
purchaser (in order to award the indirect purchaser the damages suffered), 
actually opens the door to the admissibility of the passing-on defence also for 
the members of a cartel. The same position that was finally accepted also by 
the White Paper, within the boundaries of the burden of proof we mentioned 
above. 
 
5. The Italian path to class action through the EU experience.  
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has consistently held that, in the 
absence of relevant Community rules, it is for each Member State’s legal 
system to designate the appropriate courts having jurisdiction, and to adopt the 
necessary procedural rules on the actions aimed at safeguarding those rights 
which individuals derive directly from Community law, while pointing out that 
national rules are in any case subject to the principle of effectiveness and 
equivalence of Community law.51 
                                                 
49
 Courage v. Crehan [2001] E.C.R. I-6297 at [30]. 
 
50
 J. Edelman and O. Odudu, ‘Compensatory Damages for Breach of Article 81’, 2002, 27 E.L.Rev.  
327. 
 
 
51
 See Case C-295/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico SpA, [2006] ECR I-6619, para 62,  
where the ECJ provides that such national rules “are not less favourable than those governing 
similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically 
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle 
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The harm deriving from a breach of Competition law may affect a 
significant number of individuals. Although an individual loss may be relatively 
small the aggregate loss to all potential claimants may be large. As pointed out 
by the European Commission, individual claimants may be effectively deterred 
from bringing proceedings even if they have a well-founded case, considering 
the difficulties of proving their claims, the uncertainty in outcome and the risks 
associated with the rejection of the case 52 As Nazzini stresses, the result may 
be that when the infringer harms a great number of individuals in circumstances 
where the individual loss is not sufficiently large to justify the costs and risks of 
bringing an individual claim, in the absence of an effective collective redress 
mechanism the perpetrator will not be held liable for the loss caused, and those 
who have been harmed will not be compensated.53 As a consequence, the 
effective enforcement of EC competition law, would be impaired. 
 
The Community Law obligation to respect the principle of effectiveness, 
applied to the subject at issue, ‘requires that Member States must provide an 
effective redress mechanism which ensures that the right to damages of those 
who have been harmed by competition law infringements is effective in 
circumstances in which a sufficiently large number of individual claims would in 
practice be unlikely to be brought’.54 
 
6. Collective actions in the Italian legal system.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
of effectiveness)”. See also Case C-261/95, Palmisani, [1997] ECR I-4025, para 27; and Case 
C-453/99, Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, para 29. 
 
52
 See the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on damages, at para. 6. 
 
53
 See, R. Nazzini, ‘Potency and Act of the Principle of Effectiveness: The Development of Competition  
Law Remedies and Procedures in Community Law’, in C. Barnard and O. Odudu, ‘The Outer Limits 
of EU Law’ (Hart Publishing, 2008, forthcoming). On that particular issue, the Impact Assessment 
annexed to the White Paper on damages has shown that in the absence of any measures to 
facilitate actions for damages, most of the harm caused by competition law infringements will 
continue to be left uncompensated, and victims and businesses that comply with the law will 
continue to have to absorb that loss. See, Impact Assessment Report annexed to the White Paper, 
section 2 and section 5.2.5.  
 
54
 Nazzini, footnote 46 above. More generally, see the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying  
the White Paper on damages, para. 78, where the Commission pointed out that: “According to the 
principle of effectiveness, the domestic rules governing the enforcement of Community rights may 
not render the exercise of those rights practically impossible or excessively difficult.” 
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In the absence, at least for the moment, of Community legislation, the 
design of the appropriate collective redress mechanism is left to the Member 
States. 
 
Collective actions, although a typical legal instrument of Common law 
countries, have been increasingly introduced also in Civil law countries. Up until 
the adoption of the Legge finanziaria 2008 (‘Budget law’ 2008) in December 
2007, collective actions were still not part of the Italian legal system.55 This 
instrument has been introduced by Article 2, paragraphs 445 to 449, of the Law 
244/2007 (the above mentioned “Legge finanziaria 2008”).56 
 
In particular, Article 2, para 446, reformed the Codice del Consumo (the 
Italian Consumer Code),57 introducing Article 140 bis, titled ‘Azione collettiva 
risarcitoria’ (Collective compensatory action).58 The first two paragraphs of the 
new provision deal with the associations who have a locus standi for the 
protection of consumers’ collective interests. Standing is granted, for this 
purpose, to consumers associations, professional associations and chamber of 
commerce, craftsman and industries;59 the relevant claim has to be brought in 
the Tribunale where the defendant has its residence or business.60 
                                                 
55
            It is worthwhile mentioning that the mechanism adopted by the Italian legislator is not a sectoral  
measure, concerning infringements of competition law, but a horizontal measure, covering the whole 
spectrum of sectors where consumers operate. 
 
56
 Legge n. 244 of 24 December 2007 (Legge finanziaria 2008). Paragraph 445, in particular,  
constitutes a sort of preamble of the subsequent provisions, by defining the collective 
compensatory actions for the protection of consumers as the new general instrument of 
protection in the framework of national measures aimed at ruling the rights of consumers and 
users, in accordance with the principles established at Community level in order to increase 
the standard of protection. 
 
57
 The Consumer Code has been adopted by the Decreto Legislativo (Legislative Decree) n.  
206, of 6 September 2005. 
 
58
 Article 140 of the same Consumer Code, in fact, just limited and limits itself to authorise  
consumers and users associations to act to obtain: an injunction from a Court; the adoption of 
the appropriate measures to remove the effects; and the publication of the provision itself in 
newspapers distributed nationwide. For an analysis of the new Article 140 bis of the 
Consumer Code, see, G. Costantino, La tutela collettiva risarcitoria: note a prima lettura 
dell’articolo 140 bis cod. consumo, in Foro italiano, n. 1, 2008, p. 18-24; P. MAZZINA, Prime 
considerazioni sugli aspetti costituzionali dell’”azione collettiva”, in Forum di Quaderni 
Costituzionali, published on 6 June 2008. 
 
59
  In the light of this provision, the Italian legislator introduces a form of representative action rather  
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Most importantly, as per Article 140 bis, para 2, of the Consumer Code, 
the legislator has privileged an opt-in mechanism for  Italian collective actions. 
Such a choice has been considered as inevitable as the specific features of an 
opt-out action would have allegedly raised problems at a constitutional level, in 
particular as far as Article 24 of the Italian Constitution is concerned, which 
affirms the individual right of persons to bring an action for the protection of their 
rights and legitimate interests.61 However, such a concern on opt-out 
representative actions, also supported by an alleged Article 6 ECHR argument, 
may be easily overcome by a necessary and appropriate publicity of the action 
thereof and the fact that the representative entity will not act in its own 
interest.62 
 
The consequence of the Italian legislator's choice is that consumers who 
intend to take part to a collective compensatory action, according to Article 140 
bis, par. 2, of the Consumer Code, have to give an express written 
communication of their intention to join a particular collective action. The 
adhesion may also be communicated at the appeal stage, but not after the final 
conclusive hearing. 
 
Unlike the US system, but in line with the trend in the other European 
jurisdictions, it is important to underline the absence of so-called ‘punitive 
damages’, which usually, but not exclusively, contribute to pursue public 
                                                                                                                                                                  
than a collective one. The differences between these two collective redress mechanisms are 
described by the Commission in its Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on 
damages, in particular, at para. 57. 
 
60
  Thus waiving the general principle according to which, in cases concerning consumer 
protection, the competent court is the one exercising its territorial jurisdiction in the place of 
domicile of the consumer. See, Cases C-240/98 et al., Océano Grupo Editorial, [2000] ECR I-
4941. 
 
61
 To this end, it is important to point out that the original formulation of the provision at issue,  
the one presented to the Senate, was based on an opt-out mechanism. The choice to turn to 
an opt-in one has been considered necessary to reconcile the introduction of collective actions 
in the Italian legal system with the provision of Article 24 of the Constitution. According to this 
provision, it would have been difficult to introduce in the Italian legal system a US-style ultra 
partes effects class action mechanism, whereby individuals are bound to the result of a 
collective action, thus precluding them the possibility of an individual action, except when they 
individually express their opting-out from the relevant collective action. See, P. Mazzina, Prime 
considerazioni sugli aspetti costituzionali dell’”azione collettiva”, ibid, p. 12-13. 
 
62
  That is why for purely collective actions an opt-in mechanism remains the most appropriate. 
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enforcement policies such as deterrence and punishment.63 The Italian 
legislator, instead, in accordance with Civil law principles, considers 
responsibility as implying the restoration of the patrimonial condition of the 
victim of the violation, by attributing also an amount of money which tends to 
eliminate the consequences of the damage (compensatory function).64 
 
7. Procedural peculiarities and confusion between conflicting 
competent jurisdictions in the Italian legal system.  
 
It is important to point out some procedural features concerning the 
interaction between the new rules on collective actions and the existing ones, in 
particular on civil procedure. 
 
What seems to be peculiar is that the settlement procedure, usually 
serving as a preventive pre-judicial tool, according to Article 140 bis, para 6, 
follows the recourse to litigation; in fact, while the an debeatur is subject to the 
plena cognitio of the ordinary judicial proceedings, the quantum debeatur is 
subject to a settlement procedure (camera di conciliazione) posterior to the 
contentious part of the proceedings. 
 
According to the provisions of Article 187, para 2, of the Italian Code of 
Civil Procedure, and Article 140 bis, para 3, of the Consumer Code, the Judge 
Rapporteur, at the first hearing, invites the parties to file their instances and to 
remit the case to the collegial decision of the Tribunale for admissibility 
purposes.  
 
The Tribunal, at collegial level, adopts an order appealable to the Corte 
d’Appello (Court of Appeal), deliberating in Camera di Consiglio (Council 
                                                 
 
63
  On the superiority of public antitrust enforcement to private actions for damages, for the achievement  
of the objectives of deterrence and punishment, see, W.P.J. Wils, The Relationship between Public 
Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, in World Competition, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 
2009  
 
64
 As a consequence, a US Court Judgment imposing the payment of punitive damages to an  
Italian undertaking, without any reference to the actual damage suffered by the victim, would 
breach the general principle of the public order and, therefore, it could not be applied in the 
Italian territory, according to Article 64, para 1(g), of the Law n. 218 of 31 May 1995, which 
reformed the rules of Italian Private International Law. 
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Chamber). The form of the order, however, does not prevent it from being 
considered, according to Article 111, para 7, of the Italian Constitution, as a final 
and definitive act; as a consequence, after the appeal to the Corte d’Appello, it 
can be further appealed to the Corte di Cassazione (the Italian Court of Last 
Instance).  
 
Applying by analogy the provision of Article 279, para 3, second part, of 
the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, the appeal against the order affirming the 
admissibility of the action should not suspend the main proceedings, which, 
however, might be suspended pending the appeal to the Cassazione against 
the decision of the Corte d’Appello repealing the order of the Tribunale. What 
seems to be uncontroversial, instead, is the suspension of the main 
proceedings, pending the decision of either the Corte d’Appello or the 
Cassazione, when the Tribunale has declared the inadmissibility of the case. 
 
As mentioned above, according to Article 140 bis, para 4, of the 
Consumer Code, the judgment in the main proceedings, when upholding the 
application, limits itself to set the criteria for compensation, determining only the 
minimum amount of the quantum.  
 
It must be stressed that such a decision cannot be considered an 
enforceable judgment. It does not produce executive effects, ex Article 474, 
para 2, n. 1, of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, the plaintiff is 
not entitled to register any legal mortgage as per Article 2818 of the Italian Civil 
Code. An enforceable decision can be adopted only in favour of those 
consumers who have made an express request in that sense; it is not, 
therefore, an effect of the collective action, but the result of an individual action 
proposed in the course of the same proceedings.65  
 
Alternatively to the individual action for the actual compensation, Article 
140 bis, para 6, of the Consumer Code, sets out the rules on the possible 
settlement procedures available, that is, either the establishment of an ad hoc 
Camera di conciliazione (Settlement Chamber), or the application to one of the 
                                                 
65
 G. Costantino, supra, p. 23-24. 
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settlement bodies provided in Article 38 of the Legislative Decree n. 5 of 17 
January 2003. 
 
Another problem concerns the confusion between the different 
competent jurisdictions. In fact, the already confused framework will become 
even more puzzling with the introduction of the rules on collective redress. As 
Nebbia pointed out: “it appears that the peculiarities of the Italian antitrust 
system have the potential to turn any matter concerning jurisdiction into a 
‘mare’s nest’.”66 
 
Article 1 of Law n. 287 of 10 October 1990 (the Italian Competition Act),67 
introduced a form of residual application of national competition law, whereby 
this applies only to the extent that Community law does not apply; in addition, 
Article 33, para 2 of the same Law establishes that the Corte d’Appello has sole 
jurisdiction to hear all actions concerning nullity, damages and interim measures 
concerning a breach of national competition law; on the other hand, when these 
concern Community law, the ordinary rules of jurisdiction apply. The resulting 
scenario, therefore, is as follows: if the plaintiff pleads a breach of national law, 
the competent court is the Corte d’Appello; when he pleads a breach of EC law, 
the competent court is the Tribunale, or the Giudice di Pace, depending on the 
value of the claim.68 
 
In practice, this means that if a Corte d’Appello, in the course of 
proceedings concerning a breach of national law, finds that an allegedly anti-
competitive conduct affects interstate trade, it is under a duty to apply EC law; 
this automatically entails that they lose jurisdiction to hear the case, as under 
Italian law the body entitled to apply EC law is the Tribunale. The result is that 
hardly any case will end up in Corte d’Appello, as it is now rare to find an 
infringement that would have exclusively national dimension and the Italian 
                                                 
66
 See, P. Nebbia, ‘Qso what happened to Mr Manfredi? The Italian decision following  
the ruling of the European Court of Justice, in European Competition Law Review, vol.  
28, 2007, p. 591-596, 592. 
 
67
 Law 10 October 1990 n. 287, Norme per la tutela della concorrenza e del mercato. 
 
68
 Giudici di Pace are small claims  judges who are simply required to have a law degree, but not  
necessarily further training. 
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Competition Authority has, since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, 
normally proceeded on the basis of EC law.69  
 
This situation may give plaintiffs the choice to bring proceedings either in 
the Corte d’Appello, for an infringement of national law, or in the Tribunale, for 
the infringement of Community law. As pointed out by Nebbia,70 from the point 
of view of Italian law the possibility of suing in either court (involving differing 
degrees of appeal) would undermine the principle of “giudice naturale 
precostituito per legge”. Common to several Western legal systems, this 
principle institutes the obligation for the state to establish by law the criteria to 
define as precisely as possible the competent judge for every dispute, so as to 
avoid the possibility of multiple jurisdictions for one case. 
 
As mentioned above, the new rules on collective actions will not make 
things much easier, but even more puzzling. In fact, according to Article 140 bis, 
of the Consumer Code, standing for collective redress is granted to consumer 
associations, professional associations and chambers of commerce, craftsman 
and industry; the relevant claim, however, has to be brought in the Tribunale. 
This would mean that, while the Corte d’Appello has special jurisdiction on 
individual damages claims based on a breach of national law, the Tribunale 
would have jurisdiction should the same claim be brought as a collective action. 
This seems to be an inadequate solution in terms of legal certainty. 
 
On the point, it must be remembered that in Italy the competence of the 
Court of Appeal (also) for individual damages claims filed by consumers was 
only recently acknowledged by the Corte di Cassazione, at the end of long-
lasting civil proceedings triggered on the basis of an Italian Competition 
Authority decision that established that the exchange of information carried out 
by some major insurance companies to raise the policies prices in the year 
                                                 
69
 After the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 it could not be otherwise, as Article 3,  
 para 1, of the same Regulation provides that: “Where the competition authorities of the 
Member States or national courts apply national competition law to agreements, [6], within 
the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty which may affect trade between Member States 
within the meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Article 81 of the Treaty to such 
agreements, [6].” 
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 P. Nebbia, supra, p. 593.  
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1999-2000 had infringed Section 2 of the Italian Competition Act on 
anticompetitive agreements.   
 
In fact, until judgment n. 2207/200571 the position of the Italian Supreme 
Court had been fixed in another controversial judgement (n. 17475/2002),72 that 
acknowledged the exclusive competence, at jurisdictional level, to the Court of 
Appeal in applying the national antitrust law, for damages claims filed by 
undertakings (hence foreclosing final consumers damages claims). Probably 
the influence of Regulation 1/2003 (and in particular the clear position 
expressed by the Commission in the preamble to the Regulation but also in a 
number of academic and professional discussion fora in the same period of time 
around Europe), the weight of the Courage saga (triggered in 1993!) at national 
and European level (followed by Manfredi), as well as the progressive 
acceptance of the utility and function of public and private dual enforcement to 
eradicate anticompetitive conducts in Europe, convinced the Supreme Court to 
extend the ‘coverage’ of Section 33 of the Italian Competition Act also to final 
consumers.73  
                                                 
71
  Judgment of the Corte di Cassazione of 4 February 2005. For a first commentary see A. Nicolussi,  
‘Consumatori, percorso ad ostacoli’, Il Sole 24 Ore, 11 February 2005. For a puzzling reconstruction of a civil 
law system approach to the dichotomy ‘nullity of contract’ (and restitution damages) v. ‘illegal conduct’ (and 
compensatory damages as per Section 2043 of the Italian civil code) see C. Castronovo, ‘Sezioni più unite che 
antitrust’, note to the judgment of 4 February 2005, in Europa e Diritto Privato, 2005, 444 et ss . See, of the 
same Author, Private Law Remedies for Antitrust Violations-A Point of View from Italy,  in Private 
Enforcement of EC Competition Law, J. Basedow ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 107 et s.  Castronovo, in 
an original, but coherent with the Italian legal system, reasoning, reaches the conclusion that the illegal conduct 
carried out by the cartel members (the exchange of  information aimed at raising or lowering the prices) would 
be a valid reason to consider null and void also the follow-on contract between a cartel member and a 
consumer or another business and a sufficient reason for restitution at least of that part of the price (if not all) 
that the consumer would have paid had the forces of the market been free to reach the equilibrium price. Under 
the circumstances, for the author the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court, that damages should be 
awarded to consumers ‘simply’ as a consequence of the illegal conduct, would stretch the provisions of the 
code beyond their boundaries, particularly because there is a damages award with relation to pure economic 
loss. Favorable to the innovative approach adopted by the Supreme Court, see G. Tesauro, Concorrenza e 
assicurazioni, in Sole 24 Ore, 16 February 2005. On the point of extending the same protection to final 
consumers, see also M. Libertini, Ancora sui rimedi civili conseguenti a violazioni di norme antitrust, Danno e 
Responsabilità, 2004, p. 936 et ss.  
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            The precedent position of the Supreme Court of 9 December 2002 is available in Foro Italiano, 2003, 1134. In  
fact the Supreme Court had acknowledged the competence of the Court of Appeal, on the basis of Section 33 
of the Italian Competition Act, for damages claims filed by undertakings against undertakings, for conducts 
contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Italian Competition Act, but not for consumers harmed by anti-competitive 
behaviours. A commentary to this fundamental judgment is in G. Afferni and F.W. Bulst, Kartellrechtliche 
Schadensersatz-ansprueche von Verbrauchern, Zeitschr. f. Eur. Privatrecht, 2005, 143 ss., underlying the 
extra-contractual liability of the cartel members. Bulst, in particular, deems unacceptable the limitation of 
competence to the Court of Appeal.  
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  But the doors should be open for  more detailed legislation, aimed at extending and regulating individual  
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From the undertakings’ viewpoint, individual damages actions based on 
the present national law are far more preferable, as the procedure in the Corte 
d’Appello is usually less consumer-friendly and notably more formal than with 
the Giudice di Pace. Furthermore, it seems to be clear that undertakings should 
not worry too much as regards collective damages claims in Italy, as the 
quantum to be paid to consumers is left to a settlement chamber, whose three 
members are a lawyer chosen by the President of the Tribunale and a lawyer 
chosen by each of the two parties involved; not differently therefore, from a 
transaction chamber. 
 
From a plaintiff/consumer’s perspective, it is clear that a collective action, 
before either the Giudice di Pace or the Tribunale, would be far more preferable 
for the same reasons. Therefore, once the rules on collective actions enter into 
force in Italy, consumers will be more inclined to this type of action as compared 
to the individual one, not just from a practical viewpoint but also from a 
jurisdictional one, thus giving birth to a sort of “forum shopping” sui generis for 
consumers/plaintiffs. 
 
The entry into force of the collective action mechanism provided in Article 
140 bis, of the Consumer Code, was set after 180 days from its adoption. 
Unfortunately the 1st July 2008 has gone by without the entry into force of the 
provisions in question, as the new Italian Government decided to put them 
(twice) on hold. Far from agreeing with this choice, the hope for the future is that 
this delay may trigger further debate to make it possible that also the Italian 
legal system has an effective mechanism of collective actions. To this end, the 
adoption of binding legislation at EU level, hopefully in the near future, will have 
a very welcomed positive effect towards the achievement of a more effective 
system of collective redress, more in line with the initiative of the White Paper 
on damages actions, although limited to the peculiarities of the claims 
concerning competition law infringements. 
 
8. Conclusion. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
consumers recourse to private enforcement also to the lower courts.  
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This paper is aimed at providing a first insight into the legal strategies 
that both plaintiff and defendant might be interested in adopting in the 
presence of anti-competitive or anti-consumer behaviours for which collective 
action has been filed. 
 
The US experience shows how deeply class action is enrooted in the 
constitutional principles of that country. It tackles the distortions that the class 
action system may face, in particular with respect to the concept of 
‘contingency fees’, or the advantages that legal counsel can take from a early 
settlement, in particular if compared with the exiguity of individual satisfaction. 
 
The paper then shows how the European Commission intends to 
leverage the deterrence force of US-style class action to prevent anti-
competitive behaviours (in particular the most serious frauds), even though it 
is aware that consumers and purchasers will not trigger collective actions 
when the individual claim is of a limited nature.  
 
As in the US legal system, it is possible that only those actions that are 
based on the interests of millions of people will be undertaken.  
 
The collective action is particularly burdensome, for a plethora of 
reasons, both for the plaintiff and for the defendant. ‘Social costs’ also must be 
taken into consideration, since access to justice for thousand of people 
represents an enormous burden for already fragile administrative 
infrastructures (in Italy this is of particular relevance).  
 
It seems therefore that the system of ‘filters’ encapsulated in both UK 
and Italian legislation (i.e. limiting the possibility of triggering class action to 
consumers associations) may reduce the risk of incautious access to justice 
mechanisms.  
 
For the same reasons, the follow-on actions also represent a guarantee 
of ‘reasoned’ access to justice. It is self-explanatory how the presence of a 
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well-reasoned decision, often issued after many months (or years) of 
investigation, clarifies to the victims how their actual damage resulted from 
collusive (i.e. in a cartel case) or abusive conducts that sometimes may be 
difficult to detect or understand. The presence of an antitrust case as grounds 
for a collective action sometimes also means the presence of related 
evidence.  
 
Stand-alone actions also may have an autonomous reason to exist. If 
the antitrust authority, i.e. for administrative priorities, did not trigger 
proceedings in the presence of anti-competitive conduct, a group of damaged 
people may nevertheless wish to trigger civil proceedings. This is particularly 
evident in the Italian system, where the collective action is not only based on 
the violation of competition law rules (Art. 81 and 82 EC and national 
equivalent) but also on the ‘consumer code’ provisions.  
 
This reasoning can be extended to answer a further legitimate question: 
when a competition law case arise, which forum (the competition authority or 
the court) grants the best outcome for each of the parties?  
 
In fact, as correctly underlined by several judgments of the European 
Court of Justice, the ‘administrative’ system of public enforcement, 
represented by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities, is a 
parallel way of ensuring the respect of rule of law within the European Union, 
in which the judicial system, both through individual and collective actions, 
represents perhaps the most important alternative. The main difference (as 
per John Locke’s initial quote) being that public enforcement may be 
discretionary (and the possibility of not carrying out some legal proceedings 
does not weaken the enforcement of competition law principles), while private 
action belongs to the same essence of the constitutional right of the citizen 
(therefore the fact of reducing the possibility of private, individual or collective, 
enforcement may represent a serious compression of citizen’s ‘liberty from 
offence’). 
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